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Abstract 
In most OECD countries, dial up internet accounts have typically been offered under two-part 
tariffs, where connection and usage are charged separately.  By contrast, broadband accounts 
are typically offered under flat-rate tariffs.  As consumers purchase internet accounts based 
upon their combined valuations of each of the connection and usage components, it would be 
expected that different broadband tariff structures would result in different rates of broadband 
diffusion. As broadband is the successor to dial-up internet technology, the diffusion rate will 
also depend upon the dial-up tariff structure. 
 
Using theories of two-part tariffs, bundling and price discrimination, this paper examines the 
effect of both dial-up and broadband tariff structures on broadband diffusion. Specifically, 
flat-rate broadband tariffs slow the rate of diffusion, relative to an optimal two-part tariff.  
Flat-rate tariffs prevail as a strategic means of extracting rents from early adopters with high 
connection values, but low usage valuations.  Flat-rate dial-up tariffs slow the rate of 
substitution to broadband via two mechanisms: a larger ‘connection gift’ from bundling with 
voice telephony and a larger ‘usage gift’ from usage beyond the point of marginal cost.  
Relative to an optimal two-part dial-up tariff, the marginal substituter from flat-rate dial-up to 
broadband has both a higher connection valuation and a larger usage volume.  Conversely, 
two-part dial-up tariffs where usage subsidises connection result in earlier substitution to 
broadband, as both the connection valuation and usage volumes are lower.   
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Broadband internet technology, as the frontier General Purpose Technology (GPT) (Helpman 
& Trajtenberg, 1996) via which individuals can access the internet, is widely perceived as a 
vital factor in driving a country’s economic growth potential (OECD, 2003; Crandall, Hahn & 
Tardiff, 2002).  Consequently, there has been considerable interest in the comparative rates at 
which the technology has diffused in different economies (Ford, Koutsky & Spiwak, 2007).  
Many empirical studies have been undertaken to determine those economic, policy, 
demographic and geographic factors which might plausibly explain cross-country differences 
in the most commonly-used metric – broadband connections per capita (for a summary, see 
Boyle, Howell & Zhang, 2008).   
 
Whilst there is considerable debate about the relative effect of some policies (e.g. local loop 
unbundling) and many geographic and demographic factors, unsurprisingly, most studies find 
the price at which broadband is sold is a significant factor in determining the level of 
broadband uptake in a given country.  Furthermore, as many broadband internet connections 
are sold to consumers who have previously accessed the internet via dial-up modems, the 
relative price of the technology compared to the predecessor technology is also likely a 
significant factor (de Ridder, 2007).   
 
Moreover, the predominant form of pricing of each of the legacy dial-up and frontier 
broadband technologies varies significantly across countries (e.g. in New Zealand and 
Australia, almost all dial-up access is sold at a flat-rate and broadband via a range of two-part 
tariffs, whilst in the United Kingdom and most of Europe, the reverse applies).   Yet, in most 
empirical studies, the broadband and dial-up price variables are modelled as a single price 
level, usually averaged from a range of plans available or using a standard basket of services, 
even though both products are sold using a very wide range of flat-rate and two part tariffs, 
and increasingly in bundles with other products.   
 
Despite the wide range of tariff structures observed in practice, little formal attention has been 
given to the role of either broadband or dial-up tariff structures in explaining cross-country 
differences in broadband uptake, in either the theoretical or empirical literature.  Unmetered 
dial-up tariffs have been widely anecdotally linked to both higher internet uptake and usage 
(OECD, 2000) and increasingly, comparatively slow substitution to broadband in three 
countries1 where they were used extensively (e.g. Howell, 2003, Horrigan, 2006; Wallsten, & 
Sacher, 2005; Network Strategies, 2006).  The absence of flat-rate broadband tariffs has been 
                                                     
1 The United States, Australia and New Zealand: the fourth country – Canada – initially had high broadband uptake, but unlike 
the others,  had substantially geographically de-averaged tariffs and extensive competition from cable, which could account for  
the difference (Howell, 2007).   
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further implicated in the comparatively low uptake rates in Australia and New Zealand (e.g. 
Network Strategies, 2006; MED, 2006).  Yet even in these linkages, the explanations rely 
principally upon tariff effectively lowering the comparative price level for characteristic 
baskets of connection and usage (e.g. Howell, 2003) rather than on the particular 
characteristics of the tariff structure, the valuations of different consumers, and how the 
interaction of these factors result in different effects upon the likelihood of consumers in a 
given population purchasing the technology, given past technology purchase choices.  
 
This paper begins to address the gap in the literature by examining the characteristics of tariff 
structures, their use in telephony and broadband markets, and how they might affect 
technology diffusion.  Key to this analysis is the recognition that telecommunications and 
broadband products are sold as bundles of access (connection) and usage, with flat-rate tariffs 
being the special case of unpriced usage.  In measuring broadband diffusion, uptake per capita 
is capturing only the access (connection) component at a given point in time.  The welfare 
generated in both dial-up and broadband internet markets is determined by the value to the 
consumer of the bundle of access and usage relative to the price of each component. As both 
flat-rate and two-part tariffs typically embody subsidies between the components, the extent 
to which either connection or usage is subsidised by the other (or indeed even some other 
product included in the bundle) will affect both the uptake level at a given time and the 
pattern of diffusion across time.  Furthermore, as broadband purchase is in large part 
reflecting substitution by existing dial-up internet users, broadband uptake will necessarily be 
affected by price structures and consumer valuations of each of the access and utilisation 
components of internet consumption as well as the respective prices for each over the legacy 
and frontier technologies.    
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 provides a brief description of technology diffusion 
patterns.  Section two then discusses the use of two-part and flat-rate tariffs in 
telecommunications markets and their effect upon the diffusion of a specific technology.  In 
section three, the specific issue of the role of interacting tariff structures in the diffusion of a 
frontier technology when the legacy is already well-diffused is addressed.  Both sections also 
address the effect of bundling of other products into the bundle internet connection and usage.  
Section three uses the specific example of New Zealand to illustrate the effects.  Section four 
concludes by examining the implications of the paper for the pricing of other technologies, 
notably the effect that current preferences on flat-rate broadband tariffs will have on diffusion 
from copper-based ADSL to fibre-based technologies.   
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1. Technology Diffusion 
The pattern of a technology’s diffusion is a function of consumer valuations of the product, 
the information about its availability, price and benefits, the interactions between producers 
and the nature of competition in the market (including the time at which the technology is 
first made available).  It is thus the outcome of a dynamic pattern of interaction between 
supply and demand for the good, over a period of time (Abramovitz & David, 2001).  
 
A technology typically diffuses through an economy over a period of time, in an ‘S’-shaped 
pattern (Figure 1) (Greenwood & Yorukoglu, 1997).  When it is first introduced, it is usually 
offered only by a small number of providers with market power, supply is restricted and it is 
highly-priced.  Only a very small proportion of potential users, who have a very high 
willingness to pay (the early adopters), purchase it at this price, and then conditional upon 
knowing of both the product’s existence and its potential value to them (the flat part at the left 
of the curve).  When the technology is introduced in different populations at different times, 
the curve for the population with the later introduction will, all other things being equal, lag 
the curve representing earlier introduction (Boyle, Howell & Zhang, 2008).  
  
Figure 1: Technology Diffusion Curve 
 
Source: Grosso (2006: 11) 
Over time, more potential consumers come to know of the product and its benefits, and 
purchase it if the price is below their individual valuation.  The curve starts to trend upward 
after a ‘critical mass’ of consumers – typically 5% of the addressable market – have 
purchased (Atkeson & Kehoe, 1997).  Furthermore, if there are few barriers to entry, the 
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presence of profits for the first producers and evidence of a pent-up demand for the product 
(consumers valuing the good at more than its cost of production, generally signalled by the 
diffusion curve passing the point of ‘critical mass’) induce new producers to enter the market.  
Over time, as entry occurs, the quantity produced increases and the price falls, leading to 
purchase by individuals with increasingly lower valuations of the good (the upward-sloping 
curve becomes steeper).   
 
At the midpoint, when more than 50% of the potential market has purchased the good, the 
market begins maturing.  The curve becomes less steep, as only those with low valuations are 
left to purchase (‘late adopters’).  Furthermore, the potential for price reductions becomes 
smaller the more competitive the market becomes.  When the price stabilises at long run 
marginal cost, the very last purchasers are those with the lowest valuations of the good 
(‘laggards’), reflected in the flattening at the top right.  The market is saturated, as there are 
no more potential consumers valuing it more highly than the price prevailing at that point in 
time.  Only if there are new applications developed that increase the benefit of the technology 
to users (net of the costs of acquiring them) will more ‘laggards’ purchase the technology.  
The steeper the curve, the shorter the duration of diffusion is.  If the product offers very high 
consumer benefits relative to price, the duration is typically short.  Less-highly valued or 
more expensive technologies tend to have longer durations and flatter curves.  
 
When a technology is completely new, purchase of the technology is determined by the full 
value of consumer surplus represented by the difference between willingness to pay and price.  
However, when new technology represents an iterative improvement (the frontier) upon an 
existing technology that many potential users have already purchased (the legacy), the new 
technology will be purchased by existing users only if the marginal benefits it offers exceed 
the additional cost (both purchase and switching, including foregone production of the now-
retired legacy plant) (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1998).  If all potential new users purchase the 
frontier technology because its new features offer sufficient benefits that no-one buys the 
legacy, it is said to be unconditionally dominant. The frontier diffusion curve will be 
relatively steep and the legacy curve will start trending downwards.  If some new users 
continue to purchase the legacy, the frontier is only conditionally dominant (the condition 
being that some consumers do not value the additional benefits sufficiently to pay the higher 
costs).  The frontier curve is less steep in its initial stages than in the case of a new or 
unconditionally dominant technology, whilst the legacy curve flattens but still trends upwards 
as sales continue.  
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2. Two-Part Tariffs in Telecommunications Markets 
The majority of telecommunications products have historically been offered to consumers 
under two-part tariffs, consisting of a charge to connect to the network, and a charge for usage 
(e.g. minutes of voice traffic or numbers of megabytes downloaded).  The extreme cases are 
pre-paid mobile telephony, where the connection charge is zero and all costs are recovered 
from usage fees, and ‘flat rate’ tariffs, where a fixed monthly fee is charged irrespective of the 
volume of usage consumed.  Connection and usage are physically tied in a pure bundle (a 
connection must be purchased in order to garner any of the benefits of calling).  Bundling 
enables both higher profits and higher total welfare to be engendered.  Consumers with high 
valuations for one product and low valuations for the other trade off the surplus gained from 
consuming the more-valued good against the smaller benefit gained from the less-valued 
good when making the decision to purchase the bundle.  More units of the less-valued good 
are sold than if each is priced at cost.  Tying is the special case of the purchase of one good 
only being possible if the other is also purchased (Carlton & Perloff, 2005:319-30).   
 
Menus of two-part tariffs enable consumers with different valuations of each of connection 
and usage to select the bundle that offers them highest welfare.  Consumers with lower usage 
volumes (e.g. making fewer calls or using fewer call minutes) can purchase a connection at a 
low fixed monthly charge, but pay a higher price per minute of usage (Carlton & Perloff, 
2005:317).  Miravete (2003) indicates that telephony consumers are remarkably good at 
choosing the plan that renders them most welfare for their individual usage patterns, and are 
quick to substitute when a change in plan or usage renders them worse off than under an 
alternative.   
 
2.1 Price Discrimination and Technology Diffusion 
Two part tariffs are a form of price discrimination, as they result in those subscribers on a 
given tariff consuming higher usage volumes (call numbers, call minutes or megabytes 
consumed) paying a higher effective per-unit charge for their bundle of connection and usage 
than those with lower usage volumes charged the same tariff (Carlton & Perloff, 2005:296-
308).  In effect, the tariff acts as a progressive ‘tax’ on usage.  The more calls made, the 
higher the effective tax rate.  Those making most calls (presumably because they value calling 
more highly) pay more of the subsidy towards connection than those making fewer calls (who 
presumably value calling less).  Welfare is maximised under two-part tariffs when the 
connection charge recovers all of the fixed costs incurred in providing connections, and the 
usage charge is set at marginal cost.   
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Price discrimination is common in industries characterised by high fixed costs and low 
marginal costs, notably software, live and recorded entertainment, and print media, in 
addition to its widespread use in telecommunications and other network industries such as 
electricity generation and distribution.  As long as resale between customer groups can be 
prevented (e.g. by technological blocks or other factors such as the time of consumption 
providing additional value for some consumers), those valuing the good more highly can be 
separated by their consumption behaviour and charged a higher price than those valuing it 
less highly.  Welfare is increased, relative to the case of charging only a single, high price.  
Price discrimination can be used to increase profits.  However, if the surpluses gained from 
charging high prices to high-valuing consumers to cover losses incurred in supplying low-
valuing consumers at prices below cost, then welfare can be increased without necessarily 
creating additional supplier rents.  Under some circumstances, such pricing can make it 
feasible to produce when a missing market would arise if the product was sold at a single 
price (Appendix 1).  
 
Two-part tariffs have played an important role in promoting the diffusion of fixed telephone 
connections, especially in the very price-sensitive residential market. If the connection 
component of the charge is discounted below the level required to recover a proportionate 
share of fixed costs (in effect subsidised from a charge above marginal cost for the usage 
component), those with lower valuations of the bundle due to their low value of connection2 
will purchase connections that they would not purchase if they were offered at cost, albeit 
with some trade-off in the reduction in call volumes attendant to the higher per-unit costs of 
usage (Laffont & Tirole, 2002).  If the welfare gains from the extra connections sold and the 
realisation of increased network effects and other social benefits exceeding individual ones 
outweigh the losses from lower usage, the outcome is both increased uptake of the technology 
in question and higher total welfare.   The diffusion duration is effectively shortened, and 
even more individuals will purchase than if connection was priced at cost.   
 
2.2 ‘Flat-Rate’ Tariffs and Diffusion 
By contrast, broadband internet access is typically sold as a ‘flat rate’ bundle.  Under flat rate 
tariffs, the subsidy effect works in reverse to a two-part tariff.  Low volume users face a 
higher per-unit price and therefore subsidise high volume users, whose price per unit 
consumed is effectively lower.  The ‘tax’ is regressive, as those who consume least pay the 
highest per-unit rate.   
                                                     
2 If calls are valued highly, then connection purchase will occur simply because it is a pre-requisite to making the calls in the first 
place.   
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 The effect of the subsidy will be to induce even higher levels of consumption amongst all 
users relative to cost-based usage pricing, as all individuals with a connection will now 
consume to the point where the marginal benefit of usage equals zero rather than a non-zero 
usage charge.  Recovering the additional costs incurred by higher usage volumes requires the 
network operator to charge even higher connection prices to all customers.  As the price of the 
bundle rises to cover the costs of additional usage, at the margin it will be the low-volume 
users who would otherwise underwrite the subsidies to the heavy users who will be cease 
purchasing.  Fewer connections will be sold than under the counterfactual of cost-based usage 
pricing.  Essentially, welfare accruing from additional usage (including that which is very 
low-valued as it falls below the marginal cost of production) is prioritised over welfare 
accruing from additional connections as the technology diffuses.  
 
Intuitively, a flat-rate broadband tariff structure is counterproductive if, as postulated by a 
large number of policy bodies (e.g. OECD, 2001), widespread and rapid uptake of broadband 
connections (as opposed to usage) is necessary to enable the wider social benefits of the 
‘information economy’ to be harvested.  If diffusion of the technology into the price-sensitive 
household sector is a key objective of policy-makers and regulators, then as has occurred 
historically in the fixed line and mobile telephony markets, both the rate of uptake and the 
number of connection sold would increase if two-part tariffs were mandated and the use of 
flat-rate tariffs restricted.  The intuition appears supported by data indicating that for flat-rate 
broadband package purchasers, median consumption levels fall substantially below average 
consumption.  That is, the majority of flat-rate consumers are low-volume user, who are 
subsidising a minority of very high-volume consumers.  For example, Howell (2003:31) finds 
that in the New Zealand market, average usage for a flat rate product with usage capped at 
5000Mb/month was only 1500 Mb/month and median usage 700Mb/month.  These usage 
levels were observed even though the New Zealand market offers an extensive menu of two-
part tariffs.  
 
2.3 A Two-Sided Market View of Flat-Rate Tariffs 
Further insights into the broadband tariff ‘anomaly’ come from considering flat-rate tariffs as 
a form of two-sided market (Rochet & Tirole, 2002;2003;2004; Wright, 2004; Evans & 
Schmalansee, 2005; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2006).  
Using Parker & Van Alstyne’s (2005) typology, on the ‘money side’ of the market are low 
volume users, who pay more than their own usage costs in order to underwrite the high 
volumes of usage on the ‘subsidy side’ of the market.  A two-sided market flourishes because 
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the subsidy enables both sides of the market to grow in order to capitalise upon the network 
effects to a greater extent than would occur if cost-based prices were charged on each side 
(Wright, 2004).  Pivotal to capitalising on the network effects is the relative demand elasticity 
of each side of the market.  Optimally, the subsidy is offered to the side of the market whose 
demand is more elastic as increasing prices charged to that side will have a bigger impact 
upon total network size than if the price is raised to the less elastic party on the other side 
(Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2006).   
 
Using two-sided market logic, it would appear that for the flat-rate broadband packages 
observed in practice to be the dominant form of purchase, it is the high volume users who 
have the more elastic usage demand.  By contrast, the usage demand of low-volume users 
must be less elastic.  If not, they would opt for more cost-effective two-part tariffs were they 
available, or not purchase in the first place if only flat-rate tariffs were offered. 
 
This finding suggests a very different pattern of consumer valuations of connection and usage 
prevails in the flat-rate broadband market than has been presumed in the two-part tariff 
telephony market.  In the voice market, high call numbers or minute volumes were assumed 
to be indicative of a high valuation of calling.  For a large number of low-volume broadband 
users to continue to subsidise a small number of high-volume ones, on average their valuation 
of connection must substantially exceed their valuation of usage.  Unlike the telephony 
market, where as a consequence of extensive use of two-part tariffs, it has been presumed that 
high volume users were those who valued usage highly, the opposite is the case in the 
broadband market where flat-rate tariffs prevail.  Increasingly higher usage volumes by a 
given consumer are associated with increasingly lower marginal valuation of that usage.   
 
2.4 Strategic Use of Tariff Structures Over the Product Life Cycle 
Of the explanations suggested to explain the popularity of flat-rate tariffs for broadband 
purchase, the most-offered is that such tariffs offer consumers ‘insurance’ against an 
unexpectedly high bill under two-part tariffs, possibly because consumers are unaware of the 
extent of their data transfer volumes (Ananaia & Solomon, 1997).  This is likely to be an 
especial problem in the early stages of a new technology diffusing, where new applications 
are being used and consumers face an information asymmetry that takes time and experience 
to overcome (Brownlee, 1997).  However, it seems less plausible as the technology matures, 
and user learning takes place.  Whilst new applications may lead to initially uncertain 
increases in consumption, the effect is only at the margins, and it is increasingly easier to 
isolate the effect of new applications over time if they are adopted incrementally rather than 
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simultaneously.  By comparison, residential electricity is a mature GPT sold in tied bundles of 
connection and usage that continues to be sold almost exclusively under two-part tariffs.  This 
occurs despite most consumers being unaware of the relative contribution towards the total 
cost from a myriad of different household appliances with different marginal contributions to 
the bill, and where consumers are continually purchasing new appliances that add to the total 
household consumption of electricity and hence the size of the bill.   
 
2.4.1 Two-Part Tariffs to Increase Subscription Numbers 
An alternative view is that current consumer preferences for flat-rate broadband tariffs are 
more plausibly explained by product life cycle factors.  Early adopters value connection to the 
technology more highly than average, and are prepared to pay a premium to gain access to it, 
even though their usage volumes (and valuation of that usage) may be low.  Flat-rate 
broadband tariffs offer a strategic means of producers with market power extracting 
maximum connection payments from early adopters with high connection valuation (i.e. 
inelastic demand) and hence high willingness to pay.  Whilst some consumers will also have 
high usage valuations, and proceed to also become very heavy users, the majority have low 
usage valuations.  Their usage demand is quite elastic, even though their connection demand 
is inelastic, consistent with recent survey data suggesting most existing broadband users are 
not prepared to pay very much for substantially faster broadband connections (Horrigan, 
2006; EU, 20063).   The logic is also consistent with Horrigan’s observation that usage 
volume appears to decrease as income increases. Those with higher incomes are more likely 
to be less price-sensitive, consistent with the assessment that broadband is still a ‘luxury 
good’ in the early stages of its diffusion.  
 
However, once all the early adopters have purchased at the initial flat rate offer, network 
operators can accrue additional revenues only by increasing customer numbers (increasing 
unmetered usage by existing customers adds no further revenues, and incurs costs as 
bandwidth required increases). This necessitates lowering the connection price to attract 
lower-valuing consumers.  To avoid losing existing knowledgeable high-value, low volume 
consumers to the new, lower tariff, it cannot be offered as a flat rate.  Connection and usage 
must therefore be charged as a two-part tariff.  Existing, knowledgeable low-volume users for 
whom the new tariff offers greater welfare may substitute, but as most are not especially 
price-sensitive, it is quite likely that many will remain on the flat rate tariff, especially if 
switching costs are high.  Indeed, switching costs can be raised for the most recent, 
marginally price-sensitive customers who are most likely to substitute by ‘locking them in’ to 
                                                     
3http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/info_centre/studies_ext_consult/ecomm_household_study/eb_jul06_
main_report_en.pdf  
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minimum subscription periods (12 months are common in many markets, some are as high as 
24 months) when they purchase the flat-rate tariff.  Existing high volume users will remain on 
the flat rate as the usage charges will result in their costs exceeding the existing flat rate.   
 
Thus, the pattern of increasing numbers of two-part broadband tariffs being offered as 
diffusion increases in the markets where only flat rate tariffs were offered initially (OECD, 
2007) is consistent with strategic use of pricing structures across the product life cycle in 
order to maximise profits rather than to maximise connections sold or total welfare.  The good 
has passed beyond the ‘critical mass’ and is moving from being a ‘luxury item’ to a 
‘mainstream commodity’.  The pattern is also symptomatic of the gradual eroding of the 
market power of the first providers as entry increases and competition becomes more intense 
(e.g. product variation in the market for otherwise undifferentiated wholesale and bitstream 
products).  The pattern also explains why the most ardent advocates of flat-rate tariffs are the 
disproportionately small group of high-volume users, who benefit most by having their lower-
value usage subsidised by others, and those network operators who by dint of being the first 
service operators in the market may have been extracting rents from low-using early adopters.   
 
2.4.2 Product Bundling to Attract Laggard Purchasers 
Strategic pricing over a broadband product life cycle where flat-rate tariffs are the first 
offered may also plausibly explain the extensive use of bundling as the product becomes more 
widely diffused.  Rather than cannibalising existing rents from high-valuing low-volume 
users, it may be more profitable to retain the flat-rate internet package, and bundle it with 
another product.  Ideally that product should be one that is not highly-valued by the 
broadband early adopters (to avoid cannibalisation of existing revenues from broadband 
consumers already purchasing that product), but has a large number of existing consumers 
who value it highly, but have lower valuations of broadband (e.g. video content, fixed line 
telephony, long distance calling., mobile telephony – the classic triple and quadruple play).  
By arbitraging off consumer welfare accrued on the more highly-valued product, the less 
highly-valued one is purchased at a lower effective price than the stand-alone price, whilst 
maintaining the ability to price discriminately in each of the original markets to those 
consumers who do not value the other technology sufficiently to purchase it even at the 
marginal bundled price net of any surplus remaining after purchasing the more-valued 
product.  
 
As the new broadband customers buying the bundle are consumers valuing broadband 
connection and usage at less than the flat-rate price, their usage is not likely to be high.  They 
contribute an additional fixed sum towards the cost of the broadband network which, as long 
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as it at least covers their additional costs of physical connection, preserves any profits already 
accrued by the operator in the flat-rate market.  Likewise, as long as any price charged to 
existing broadband consumers to purchase the new product exceeds their connection costs, 
margins in that market are preserved also (Carlton & Perloff, 2005:321-2).  Specifically, if the 
marginal costs of servicing each user of the newly-bundled products are low compared to 
fixed costs, under classic price discrimination reasoning, such a strategy actually increases all 
of profits, diffusion of both products and consumer welfare (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1999).   
 
Bundling across product markets in this manner plausibly explains why, despite prices being 
similar,  empirical studies have found competition between platforms (cable and DSL) is 
more statistically significantly associated with and has a larger empirical effect on, broadband 
uptake than in competition on a single platform (e.g. unbundled DSL) (Distaso. Lupi & 
Manenti, 2006; Denni & Gruber, 2005).   Product bundling from another medium (e.g. cable 
television) maximises the number of low-valuing broadband consumers purchasing the 
technology, relative to only those consumers having access only to bundles of telephony-
based broadband and its associated products (voice telephony, long-distance  calling)4.   
  
3. Flat Rate Tariffs and Technological Substitution 
Whilst the preceding section describes the strategic use of tariff structure across the life-cycle 
of a new technology, it does not address the question of how tariff structure affects the 
diffusion of a new generation of a given technology, especially if extensive cross-
subsidisation is already occurring in the legacy technology market as a consequence of 
extensive use of flat-rate tariffs and bundling. This issue has already been confronted in 
respect of the internet access market, where legacy dial-up internet access and 2G mobile 
telephony, have been superseded by frontier broadband and 3G mobile technologies 
respectively.  It will also be confronted in the future, when copper-based broadband 
technologies become the legacy and are superseded by the new fibre-based frontiers.   
                                                     
4 It is noted, however, that an especial benefit arises from bundling broadband services with PSTN voice services.  As dial-up 
internet access on the PSTN is substituted by broadband, the substituting consumer’s valuation of the PSTN for voice telephony 
will decrease but not be removed completely.  Dial-up internet use is shifted from one technology to the other, decreasing the 
value of one technology and increasing the value of the other. Tying two products, the consumer valuations of which are almost 
certainly negatively correlated with each other, offers the best possible scenario for maximising the profits from bundling, in 
addition to the welfare gains from selling to a larger number of low-valuing consumers on each of the networks.   
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 3.1 The New Zealand Case 
The tariff structure element of the substitution dilemma is illustrated cogently by the 
introduction of dial-up internet access and its successor ADSL broadband in the New Zealand 
telephony market.  Since the introduction of telephony to the country in 1879, when the 
Superintendent of Telegraphs eschewed the practice of charging for calls connected within a 
given exchange as it was deemed too costly for telephonists to record the relevant details, 
New Zealand has had ‘free local calling’ – that is, flat-rate local telephony charges (Howell, 
2007). Over time, the ‘free local calling zones’ became determined by political rather than 
exchange technology considerations.   .   
 
Consequently, the New Zealand ‘free local calling’ areas are amongst the most extensive in 
the world (NZIER, 2005).  Whilst the tariff policy has resulted in New Zealand having a 
lower fixed line teledensity than most other OECD countries (OECD, 2003), the volume of 
calls made is very much larger than in the average OECD country where either call  minutes 
or the number of calls made were subject to a charge (NZIER, 2005; Howell & Sangekar, 
2008).  The obligation to continue offering free local calling was transferred to the new 
owners of the incumbent when it was privatised in 1990 (Howell, 2007).   Furthermore, New 
Zealand also has a long history of universal service pricing for telephone connections.  The 
very large numbers of urban consumers pay a premium above cost to subsidise the minority 
of rural consumers who pay the same monthly tariff, even though the costs they impose are 
higher.  The ‘universal service’ obligation was also transferred to the private sector owners.  
 
Despite exhibiting one of the highest rates of both uptake and usage of the internet in the 
OECD between 1996 and 2003 (Howell, 2003), in June 2007, New Zealand exhibited one of 
the lowest rates of broadband uptake (20th in the OECD and below the OECD average – 
OECD, 2008), despite having one of the most widespread ADSL networks of high quality and 
offered at comparatively low prices (Howell, 2008; OECD, 2008).  Furthermore, unlike in 
most other OECD countries, New Zealand’s broadband packages have always been offered as 
menus of two-part tariffs5, albeit with some of the lowest charges per additional megabyte 
downloaded6.   Whilst this should have, all other things being equal, have accelerated the rate 
of broadband usage amongst a highly-connected, high-using population relative to other 
                                                     
5 Principally due to the fact that over 90% of New Zealand’s internet traffic is downloaded from  offshore, via the solitary trans-
Pacific Southern Cross Cable and by dint of the fact that this cable ‘peers’ with the worldwide web in the United States, the small 
number of New Zealand users must pay a disproportionate share of the cost of data transport relative to other markets where 
traffic volumes exchanged are more symmetric and the distances to the peering point are more even.   
6 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/39575048.xls  
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countries where flat-rate broadband offers prevailed, the opposite appears to have occurred in 
New Zealand.  The hypothesis derived from the preceding discussion is that New Zealand’s 
slow broadband uptake is in large part attributable to the flat-rate tariff under which the dial-
up internet product was sold.  That is, flat-rate dial-up tariffs have resulted in the New 
Zealand broadband diffusion curve lagging the curve of the ‘average’ OECD country where 
two-part dial-up internet tariffs prevailed.  
 
3.2 Bundling, Flat-Rate Tariffs and Substitution 
Although dial-up internet technology can be considered a legacy technology, enabling 
examination of each of the components of connection and usage in prices charged for both it 
and the frontier broadband technology, it must be taken into account that at the outset, by dint 
of technological fortune, dial-up internet access and usage were offered as a bundle with 
existing dial-up voice technology.  As the New Zealand case illustrates, this has influenced 
initial tariffs for both connection and usage of dial-up access.  The starting point for analysis 
must be the patterns of connection and usage induced by the initial bundling, as well as the 
tariff structure itself.   
 
3.2.1 Bundling Confers a ‘Connection Gift’ 
Due to the ‘bundling’ of voice telephony and dial-up Internet access, in respect of the 
telephony component of internet access, existing telephony customers were ‘gifted’ a free 
internet connection, regardless of how highly they valued it.  The higher the fixed price 
charged for the connection component of internet access, the greater the extent of the 
‘connection gift’ offered by connection bundling.  The connection gift was greatest in respect 
of those subscribing to ‘flat-rate’ telephony tariffs, as the higher volume of usage in these 
accounts would have necessitated a higher fixed charge to compensate for the even greater 
volumes of usage incurred.   
 
When broadband internet access was introduced, users assessing the desirability of 
substituting from dial-up to broadband internet access were required to assess not the absolute 
the price of the access component of broadband, but the marginal outlay given the value of 
the existing dial-up connection ‘gift’. For a given broadband access price, the valuation of 
internet connection at which the marginal dial-up user subscribing to a flat-rate telephony 
tariff will substitute is higher than the valuation of the marginal two-part tariff subscriber.  
The lower the fixed component of the dial-up two-part tariff (i.e. if usage priced above cost 
was used to subsidise connections, thereby lowering the connection cost to speed up 
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telephony diffusion), the lower the valuation of internet connection at which the marginal user 
would substitute (Howell, 2008).    
 
If valuations of internet connection and usage are identically distributed across two 
populations, one with flat-rate access only and one with two-part tariffs, on the basis of the 
connection gift alone the population facing a two-part tariff will exhibit earlier substitution to 
broadband than the flat-rate tariff market (that is, as per Figure 1, the broadband diffusion 
curve of the two-part tariff market will sit to the left of the curve for the flat-rate tariff 
market).  The smaller the fixed price component in the two-part tariff market, the greater will 
be the time lag observed in the broadband diffusion curves of the two populations (i.e. the 
greater will be the gap between the two curves).  
 
In the New Zealand case, due to the combined effect of flat-rate dial-up tariffs and the 
universal service obligation, the internet ‘connection gift’ was likely the most substantial in 
the OECD.  Thus, it would be expected that the New Zealand broadband diffusion curve 
‘connection gift’ lag relative to an optimal two-part tariff would be the largest in the OECD.  
Moreover, the lag behind any country still subsidising PSTN connections from usage would 
be even greater.   
 
3.2.2 Flat-Rate Tariff Confers a ‘Usage Gift’ 
As flat rate tariffs induce usage up to the point where the marginal benefit of usage is zero, 
bundling dial-up internet access with voice telephony results in the maximum possible use of 
the technology, regardless of the individuals’ valuation of connection (also gifted).  Thus it is 
not surprising to find that not only were New Zealanders amongst the most prolific 
connectors to the internet (measured in ISP accounts per capita) (Howell, 2003), but also 
amongst the most prolific users (OECD, 2000).  Figures 2 and 3 illustrate both the huge 
increase in PSTN traffic following the introduction of dial-up internet access, and the very 
high volumes of connection time – averaging 35 hours per month for each of the 850,000 
dial-up accounts at peak.  However, as has been noted above, most of this huge volume of 
usage is very low-valued.  Indeed, much of it will be incurred by individuals with both a low 
value of internet connection and a low value of usage, who may not have purchased either if 
they were not gifted but instead offered at cost.   
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Figure 2.  New Zealand Telephone Traffic 1996-2003 
 
Source: Howell & Obren (2003:33).  
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As with the ‘connection gift’, the ‘usage gift’ affects the point at which a user with a given 
pair of connection and usage values will substitute to broadband.  The higher the usage 
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charge, the lower the volume of usage at which there is a net benefit to the user of substituting 
to broadband.  In the hypothetical populations above, once again at the extreme, flat-rate dial-
up internet users will, all other things being equal, exhibit the highest volumes of usage at 
which the marginal substitution takes place.  If, as Figure 3 suggests, substitution to 
broadband occurs because, over time, internet users are incurring more usage, to the point 
where the benefits (in time savings) of shifting that usage to faster broadband finally 
outweigh the benefits of the usage gift, once again, it would be expected to see the diffusion 
curves of flat-rate tariff markets lagging those of markets where two-part tariffs are charged.  
The lag will be greater the larger is the charge for usage levied under the two-part tariff.    
 
It can now be seen that flat-rate tariffs for dial-up internet access impose a ‘double delay 
penalty’ in the timing of substitution from dial-up internet access to broadband access relative 
to a two-part tariff, via each of the connection and usage effects.   The effect of the delay will 
be greatest in relation to those two-part tariffs where connection has been most extensively 
discounted and usage charges increased in order to encourage higher diffusion of the legacy 
voice telephony technology with which dial-up internet access has been bundled.  As New 
Zealand sits at the extreme opposite end of the spectrum, in respect of its flat rate dial-up 
tariffs and universal service obligations, the lag in the country’s diffusion curve from the two-
part tariff optimum would be expected to be the most extensive in the OECD.   
 
3.2.3 Diffusion Time Lags and the Value of Usage 
Figure 3 confirms that, although New Zealand might lag most of the OECD in respect of the 
point in time when the broadband market passed the ‘critical mass’ point of 5% of potential 
diffusion, the effect has been simply a shift to the right of the curve on a time axis.  The graph 
confirms that New Zealand’s broadband uptake is almost perfectly accounted for by 
substitution from dial-up access.  The market has gone from 5% diffusion in quarter 4 2003 to 
50% diffusion in quarter 4 2006 (measured against the peak number of dial-up accounts as the 
addressable market).  Over the period 2005-6, New Zealand’s rate of broadband account 
growth was one of the fastest in the OECD (OECD, 2007).  Figure 3 also confirms that the 
‘critical mass’ ‘tipping point’ coincided with the point of maximum usage recorded per dial-
up account. 
 
As there were no significant changes in broadband price or other market characteristics 
around the tipping point, it would appear that in flat-rate legacy technology markets, it is only 
when an increasing volume of usage sufficiently affects the trade-off between the value of the 
legacy and the value of the frontier to the user that substitution will occur.  This may be due 
to using the same internet applications more extensively, or adding new applications, notably 
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those which offer significantly more benefit on the frontier than on the legacy (e.g. they 
cannot function effectively on the legacy.  Widespread subscription to a new application or 
set of applications which are increasingly used (thereby increasing the value of internet use to 
consumers) appears to offer the best explanation for the timing of New Zealand’s ‘tipping 
point’.   
 
Whilst peer-to-peer applications such as Skype, YouTube, Facebook and Bebo are universal 
and started to come into mainstream use around 2003, their use is still confined to a minority 
of the population.  A New Zealand-specific explanation for increasing widespread broadband 
account sales likely lies in the country’s most-visited web property, the consumer-to-
consumer trading portal TradeMe.  Figure 4 illustrates the expansion of TradeMe, the web 
pages of which comprise large quantities of rich graphic material which is very time-
consuming to download and upload on dial-up.  TradeMe is an application that offers a new 
set of value to New Zealand internet users that, through its diffusion, will increase the value 
of internet use for those who subscribe to its services.   
Figure 4 
 
Source: Dominion Post March 12 2008 p A7;  http://www.stuff.co.nz/4435153a6479.html  
 
In 2003, TradeMe had fewer than 150,000 members – about 0.2 per active internet account.  
By February 2008, it had nearly 2 million active members (2 per active internet account).  
New Zealand’s total population is only just over 4 million, indicating very widespread 
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diffusion of the application.  Page views averaged over one billion a month – the equivalent 
of over 520 per member per month, or over 1000 per active internet account.  Of the 2 million 
members, on average each accesses the site from two unique computer addresses (likely home 
and work).  These volumes of TradeMe activity would suggest that the average value of 
internet use has increased markedly over the period as large numbers of New Zealanders 
substitute from other methods of consumer-to-consumer trading (e.g. classified 
advertisements; garage, car boot and jumble sales; physical marketplaces) to electronic 
exchange.  For the large numbers of New Zealanders now using the site, it is this demand-side 
usage factor, rather than any supply-side broadband price or availability factors, that appear to 
be driving broadband connection purchase.  Co-incidentally, the growth of TradeMe 
membership (Figure 4) and page view volumes is almost perfectly correlated with the growth 
of broadband connection purchase (Figure 3).   
 
4. Implications 
By separating out the effects of connection and usage in two-part tariffs, this paper has shown 
that flat-rate tariffs in the first instance slow the diffusion of a new technology relative to an 
optimal two-part tariff, and in the second instance delay the substitution from a legacy 
technology to a frontier one.  The delay in substitution is even further exacerbated if the initial 
connection is ‘gifted’ or subsidised on some form as a consequence of it being purchased in a 
bundle (i.e. if it is purchased as the lower-valued item in a bundle where the choice to buy 
relies upon the existence of consumer surplus from the higher-valued good).  In order to 
induce substitution, the consumer must value the benefits sufficiently more than the price 
paid.  If the consumer values the good lowly and is only purchasing it because of either the 
bundle subsidy (‘connection gift’) or flat-rate tariff ‘usage gift’, then the low-valuing users 
will substitute only when the new good is offered at a price lower than their existing low 
valuations, or some other exogenous factor (e.g. the development of new applications capable 
only of functioning on the frontier technology) leads to them increasing their valuations of 
either connection or usage substantially.  
 
The implications are significant for the migration of users from flat-rate and bundled 
broadband connections to the new frontier technology, fibre-based internet connections.  
Unless these technologies are associated with new applications unable to be offered on 
existing technologies (e.g. ADSL-2), then although a small number of early adopters will 
substitute, the rate at which the vast majority of existing users will substitute will be delayed 
relative to the case of two-part tariffs or unbundled products.   
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There are risks also for network operators, regulators and policy-makers in making the 
decisions to invest or regulate networks where the products are extensively cross-subsidised 
from either flat-rate tariffs or bundling.  Such tariffs obfuscate information otherwise 
available about consumers’ respective valuations normally available from self-selected two-
part tariffs. Without more fully understanding the relationships between the consumers’ 
respective valuations of each of the separate connection and usage components, it is possible 
to made incorrect assumptions about the appropriate time to invest or regulate a network, or 
inappropriately price products offered on it.  This indicates that effective management and 
regulation of networks where flat-rate tariffs and bundling prevail necessitates information 
about patterns of usage as well as patterns of connection.  It is not sufficient to presume that 
past information supporting the management and regulation of markets where two-part tariffs 
prevailed will suffice in flat-rate and bundled tariff markets.   
 
The salutary lesson in this respect lies in the New Zealand case.  In 2006, the government 
introduced local loop unbundling regulation of the incumbent telecommunications provider 
because broadband uptake was not occurring as fast in New Zealand as in other OECD 
countries (MED, 2006).  The analysis supporting the regulation consisted almost-exclusively 
of supply-side factors and failed to take into account the effects of tariff structure (either the 
historic use of two-part broadband tariffs which would have increased the diffusion rate or 
flat-rate dial-up tariffs which would have delayed it) on diffusion (Howell, 2007).   The risk is 
that, as occurred in New Zealand in 2006, additional regulation will be introduced to ‘speed 
up’ diffusion of a technology when in the Zealand case, retail tariff regulation or historic 
commercial pricing patterns in the legacy market are a principal cause of delayed diffusion.   
 
Ultimately, technology diffusion is the result of the interaction of supply and demand 
characteristics.  Consumer valuations are the means by which demand enters these 
interactions.  Tariff structure for telecommunications products must take into account both 
connection and utilisation components.  Unless both of these factors are considered, both firm 
strategy and regulation may be misguided, harming both profitability and social welfare.    
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Appendix 1:  Price Discrimination and Missing Markets 
In some circumstances, the demand for a good indicates consumers are unwilling to pay the 
costs of production, even though they would derive some welfare from the good.  This gives 
rise to typical ‘missing market’.  The good is not produced.  However, over that portion of the 
cost curve where economies of scale exist (i.e. the average cost curve is downward-sloping), 
if it is possible to separate high-valuing customers from low-valuing ones and prevent resale, 
it may be feasible to charge two prices in such a manner that the firm can recover its costs and 
therefore justify producing.  Figure A1 illustrates.  
 
Figure A1: Price Discrimination Overcomes Missing Market 
$ AC 
P1 
P* 
P2 
D
Q Q1 Q*
 
By producing the larger quantity Q*, the producer access economies of scale by producing at 
an average cost of P*.  Given the demand curve D above, the producer can sell the first Q1 
units at price P1  above average cost, generating profits (producer surplus) represented by top 
left (diagonal stripes top left to bottom right).  The next Q*- Q1 units are sold at P2 less than 
cost, incurring a loss represented by the bottom right rectangle (diagonal stripes bottom left to 
top right).  As only Q* units are sold in total, as long as the profits incurred on the sale of the 
first Q1 units exceed the losses on the next Q*- Q1 units, the producer has net profits so will 
produce the good.   Price discrimination thus leads to a good being produced, and welfare 
accrued from its consumption and production, that would not accrue if the good was sold at a 
single price.                
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